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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

KIP LANE MASSEY,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No.

950431-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for
a new trial after a jury convicted him for theft by receiving
stolen property, a second degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-408 (1995), and for selling a firearm to a juvenile,
a third degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-509.9
(1995) (R. 64-65).

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion for new
trial based on his claim that a jury should hear the codefendant's live confession to the same crime even though the
trial court admitted co-defendant's hearsay confession at
defendant's trial?

The trial court has a "wide range of discretion in
determining" whether to grant a motion for a new trial.
James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991).

State v.

This Court assumes the

trial court properly exercised its discretion "unless the record
clearly shows the contrary."

Id.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ANP RULES
Addendum A contains the text of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-408
(1995) and 76-10-509.9 (1995), and Utah R. Crim. P. 24.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant and Casey Sanslow with theft by
receiving stolen property, a second degree felony, pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1995), and with selling a firearm to a
juvenile, a third degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 7610-509.9 (1995) (R. 4-5). Although the record contains no
severance order, separate courts handled defendant's and Casey's
cases.
A jury convicted defendant of the charged crimes (R. 64-65).
The trial court sentenced defendant to the statutory prison terms
of one to fifteen years on the theft conviction and zero to five
years on the firearm sale conviction, suspended both sentences,
and placed defendant on 24-months probation (R. 78-80) .
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Defendant filed a motion for new trial (R. 84-85), which the
trial court denied (R. 107-108).

Defendant timely appealed from

the denial of his motion (R. 109-10).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 19, 1994, someone burglarized Terry Sanlow's home
and stole his .22 caliber Derringer (R. 200-202) . Terry is codefendant Casey Sanslow's father (R. 200).
On June 21, 1994, Grant Kirby purchased the stolen .22
Derringer from defendant (R. 210, 213-14, 217, 245-46) . Grant
was fifteen at the time (R. 208). Grant's brother Travis was
present at the sale (R. 245). Travis was seventeen at the time
(R. 242).
When police stopped Grant and another brother, Greg, in
August 1994, they discovered the stolen gun (R. 218, 267). Grant
told the police that defendant sold him the gun (R. 219, 269-71).
On August 29, 1994, police interrogated defendant about the
gun sale (R. 281-82).

Defendant denied ever seeing the Derringer

before or knowing about a stolen gun or the burglary in at Terry
Sanslow's home (R. 283-84).
However, in a written statement given the next day,
defendant stated that Casey had told him about the burglary, and
that Casey had sold the gun to Grant Kirby (R. 291). At trial,
3

defendant testified that Casey admitted taking the gun from his
father's house approximately one week before the burglary, and
that Casey told him that Casey had sold the gun to Travis Kirby
(R. 337, 342).
On August 30, 1994, after defendant gave police his written
statement, police interrogated Casey Sanslow (R. 286-87, 294) .
Casey gave police a written statement as follows:
I, Casey Sanslow, had in my possession on June 21st a
little .22 handgun which I sold to the Kirby twins for
$35 with a gun case, and Kip Massey was not and had
nothing to do with it. At the time I did know that it
was stolen gun.
(R. 295-96).

One of the investigating officers read that

confession to the jury (id.).

The officer also testified that

Casey had always maintained that he committed the crime and that
defendant knew nothing about it (R. 288-90, 311) .
The argument section contains additional relevant facts.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant moved for a new trial in order to call Casey
Sanslow to testify and confess to the crime.

The trial court

denied the motion because the jury that convicted defendant heard
Casey's hearsay confession.
decision.

This Court should affirm that

First, defendant waived his appellate claim because,

when he moved for a continuance to obtain Casey's attendance, he
4

told the trial court that the hearsay confession would suffice.
Second, the proposed live testimony, although providing slightly
more detail than the hearsay confession, added nothing to the
substance of the evidence presented to the convicting jury: that
Casey admitted responsibility for the crime and denied
defendant's involvement.

Third, the proposed live testimony

would not have added enough more detail to make a different
outcome on retrial reasonably probable.

Each of these bases

independently requires affirming the denial of defendant's
motion.
ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS APPELLATE CLAIM; ALTERNATIVELY,
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL TO HAVE CASEY TESTIFY BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT
ADMITTED CASEY'S OUT-OF-COURT CONFESSION
Defendant claims that the trial court should have granted a
new trial so that Casey could have testified to confess to the
crimes.

Two days prior to trial, defendant requested a

continuance to permit Casey to testify (R. 98-101).

Defendant

told the trial court that Casey had signed a written statement
claiming that defendant had no involvement, and that Casey was
therefore a necessary witness (R. 99-100).

Defendant also told

the court that Casey would not enter his plea on the same charges

5

until April 17 and would assert his Fifth Amendment privilege if
called to testify before pleading (R. 99).
The trial court denied the motion for continuance (R. 101).
Defendant has not appealed that ruling (R. 109-110).

The trial

court admitted Casey's out-of-court confession (R. 295-96).
After the jury convicted him, defendant moved the trial
court for a new trial so that Casey, who had pleaded guilty by
that time, could testify before a jury (R. 84-85, 462).
Defendant submitted an affidavit outlining Casey's proposed live
testimony (R. 103-105).
addendum B.

A copy of the affidavit is attached as

In the affidavit, Casey again accepted

responsibility for the crimes and exonerated defendant (R. 104).
In addition, the affidavit testimony contains a few more details.
For example, Casey more specifically identified the gun as a
Derringer and testified that he sold to Travis Kirby rather than
"the Kirby twins (R. 103-104, 295-96).

Defendant argued that

Casey's proposed live testimony would provide "just some basic
impeachment material" (R. 464).

6

The trial court denied the motion, ruling:
Given fact that the Court allowed the confession in of
the Co-defendant and apparently is consistent with what
you indicated his testimony would be, it gets to be an
issue of credibility. The Court will deny the motion
for a new trial
(R. 468).
A trial court may "grant a new trial in the interest of
justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a
substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party."
Crim. P 24(a).

Utah R.

In order to require a new trial, Casey's evidence

must meet three criteria: M l ) it must be such as could not with
reasonable diligence have been discovered and produced at the
trial; (2) it must not be merely cumulative; and (3) it must be
such as to render a different result probable on the retrial of
the case."

State v. Jiron. 882 P.2d 685, 689 (Utah App. 1994),

cert- denied, 892 p.2d 13, (Utah 1995).
The trial court had a "wide range of discretion in
determining" whether Casey's post-trial availability warranted a
new trial.

State v. James. 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991).

This

Court assumes the trial court properly exercised its discretion
"unless the record clearly shows the contrary."

Id.

Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously denied
his motion.

Essentially, defendant argues that the trial court
7

should have granted his motion because Casey was unavailable to
testify at the time of trial and the hearsay confession could not
substitute for Casey's live testimony.
Defendants appellate claim fails for three reasons, each of
which independently defeats it: 1) defendant waived his claim
that he was entitled to Casey's live testimony; 2) Casey's
proposed live testimony was merely cumulative of the hearsay
confession; and 3) Casey's live testimony does not render a
different result on retrial probable.
A.

Defendant waived his appellate claim.

When the State opposed the continuance and the trial court
asked defense counsel if she would be prepared to try the case on
the scheduled date, defense counsel responded:
Your Honor, we are aware of the problem that the
co-defendant has, however I have no control over when
he enters his plea or not.
If that's the case, Your Honor, we'd be making a motion
that he be at least declared unavailable so we can use his
statement.
* * * *

That he be declared unavailable so we can use his
statement. I believe it's 803 or 4, that if a defendant or
a witness is going to take the Fifth Amendment, we can have
him declared unavailable. If we can do that, I'd have no
problem continuing -- going forward on Thursday.

8

(R. 100)(emphasis added).

The trial court ultimately admitted

the written confession (R. 295-96).
Defendant did not complain about the trial court's selection
of admitting the confession rather than delaying the trial until
after the jury convicted him (R. 99-101).

When defendant told

the trial court that he could proceed if he could use the hearsay
confession, he conditionally waived any claim that only Casey's
live confession would suffice.

When the trial court admitted the

hearsay confession, it complied with the contingency and the
waiver became complete.

Defendant cannot complain on appeal that

the trial court erroneously denied his motion for a new trial to
hear live testimony when he waived that claim by previously
telling the trial court that live testimony would be unnecessary
if he could use the hearsay confession.

Cf. State v. Medina, 73 8

P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987) (defendant could not accept a jury
instruction, then challenge it on appeal).
B.

Casey's testimony was cumulative.

The trial court denied the motion because it found that
Casey would have testified consistently with the hearsay
confession admitted at trial (R. 468); in other words, that
Casey's live testimony would have been merely cumulative to the
hearsay confession.
9

The record does not clearly establish that the trial court
abused its discretion in making this determination.

In the

hearsay confession that the trial court admitted, Casey admitted
committing the same crimes with which the State charged defendant
and denied that defendant had any involvement (R. 4-5, 295-96).
In addition, the investigating officer testified that Casey
always maintained that he, not defendant, sold the gun to the
Kirbys (R. 288-290, 311). Because the hearsay confession and
Casey's proposed live testimony provided the same substantive
evidence, the trial court correctly concluded that the proposed
live testimony was cumulative.
Defendant contends that the greater detail in Casey's
proposed live testimony would have given greater "credibility" to
Casey's confession and consequently to defendant's defense;
therefore, according to defendant, the live testimony was not
cumulative.

Appellant's Brief at 18-19.

When a trial court

denies a motion for new trial based on the discovery of new
credibility evidence, the denial generally does not warrant
reversal.

State v. Worthen. 765 P.2d 839, 851 (Utah

1988)(evidence that had minor impeachment value did not justify a
new trial).

See also. State v. James, 819 P.2d at 794 (dicta).

Even if Casey's live testimony would provide greater detail, the
10

extra detail does not make the live confession non-cumulative of
the hearsay one.

The extra detail went to peripheral matters,

like corroborating that defendant had never seen the Derringer,
specifically identifying Travis Kirby as the buyer, and
specifically identifying the .22 pistol as a Derringer.

However,

the hearsay confession provided the important information: Casey
insisted that he committed the crimes and that defendant had no
knowledge of them.

The trial court properly concluded that the

proposed live testimony was cumulative.

Cf. State v. Goddard.

871 P,2d 540, 545 (Utah 1994) (trial court properly denied motion
for new trial where Goddard's proposed new witness's testimony
was not sufficiently inconsistent with evidence at trial).
Defendant relies on State v. James to suggest that live
testimony can never be cumulative of hearsay evidence.
Appellant's Brief at 17. James does not support that
proposition.

In James, the defense discovered a witness who

would testify that one of the State's key witnesses perjured
himself when he testified that he overheard James confess to
another inmate that James had killed his son.
819 P.2d at 793.

State v. James,

James moved for a new trial on the basis of

newly discovered evidence.

Id.

The trial court found that the

new witness's testimony was merely cumulative of defendant's
11

denial that he made the confession.

Id. at 794. The supreme

court reversed, holding that the evidence was not cumulative, but
was "independent evidence which corroborated defendant's
statements."

Id. at 795.

In James the jury heard no testimony, live or otherwise,
corroborating James' testimony.

In this case, the jury heard

hearsay testimony corroborating defendant's testimony.

James

does not require that the jury hear the corroborating evidence
from the declarant.

Because the jury heard the corroborating

evidence in this case, the trial court correctly concluded that
Casey's live confession would be merely cumulative of his hearsay
confession.

C.

Casey's live testimony does not make a different result
probable on retrial-

Defendant has not shown that Casey's live testimony would
succeed where his hearsay confession failed.

Defendant contends

that the additional detail in Casey's proposed live testimony
would prevent the State from exploiting the lack of detail in the
hearsay confession to challenge the confession's credibility.
Appellant's Brief at 18-19.
Defendant's argument refers to the State's closing argument
challenging the hearsay confession because: 1) Casey did not

12

describe the gun very well, suggesting that perhaps he was
thinking of another gun sale; and 2) Casey incorrectly referred
to Grant and Travis as twins (R. 408-409).

That Casey's proposed

live testimony cures these two problems does not make a different
outcome probable on retrial.
First, the additional details would not prevent the State
from challenging Casey's credibility.

The prosecutor could use

the added detail to suggest that Casey had used the time between
his written statement and defendant's conviction to coordinate
his story to mirror defendant's trial testimony.

The added

detail could make the proposed live testimony less credible, not
more.
Second, defendant's argument ignores the other evidence
bolstering the statement's credibility.

For example, the

investigating officer stated that Casey consistently maintained
his guilt and defendant's innocence (R. 288-90, 311). Moreover,
defense counsel reinforced the confession's credibility by
pointing out that Casey had no motive to lie and gained nothing
by confessing (R. 409-410, 415). Despite defense counsel's
argument and the officer's testimony, the jury convicted
defendant.

The additional detail in Casey's proposed live

testimony would not render a different result.
13

See State v.

Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 545 (Utah 1994)(proposed new rebuttal
witness's testimony did not make a different result probable
where her testimony was not sufficiently inconsistent with the
evidence presented).
Finally, defendant's argument ignores the other evidence of
defendant's guilt.

Grant and Travis consistently identified

defendant as the one who sold Grant the Derringer (R. 213-14,
217, 246, 270-71).

The investigating officers testified that

neither boy ever changed his story about who sold them the gun
(R. ??) . Defendant admitted that the Kirbys had no reason to
falsely identify him, although he did speculate that they may
have falsely identified him out of revenge for defendant evicting
a tenant defendant claimed supplied the Kirbys with drugs (R.
352) .
Moreover, defendant's inconsistent statements deteriorated
his credibility.

Defendant first denied ever seeing the

Derringer before or knowing about a stolen gun or the burglary in
Carbon County (R. 283-84). Later, defendant stated that Casey had
told him about the burglary, and that Casey had sold the gun to
Grant Kirby (R. 291). At trial, defendant testified that Casey
admitted taking the gun from his father's house approximately one
week before the burglary, and that Casey told him that Casey had
14

sold the gun to Travis Kirby, not Grant Kirby (R. 337, 352). As
defendant increasingly exonerated himself at Casey's expense, and
as the story altered to make it less consistent with the Kirbys'
testimony, defendant deteriorated the credibility of his own and
Casey's denial that he had any involvement in the crimes. That
Casey may have more specifically identified the gun and the Kirby
brother to whom he sold it if the trial court had allowed him to
testify at a retrial would not sufficiently rehabilitate
defendant's own credibility to make a different outcome probable.
Moreover, defendant's contention that allowing the jury to
see Casey would render a different result probable is highly
speculative.

Relying on the hearsay confession precluded the

State from cross-examining Casey and undermining his confession.
Presenting only the hearsay confession may have been a windfall
to defendant.
In sum, defendant waived his claim that the trial court
should have given him a new trial to allow Casey's live
confession testimony when he had previously told the trial court
that the hearsay confession would serve as well.

Alternatively,

Casey's proposed live testimony was cumulative and not shown to
be sufficiently compelling to make a different result probable.

15

Therefore, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion for
a new trial.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons argue above, the State requests that the
Court affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a
new trial.
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UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

determined to be illegal or unauthorized, 87
A-LJEUth 384.

Rule 24

Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *» 977 to
996.

Rule 23. Arrest of judgment.
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own
initiative may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the
facts proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the defendant is
mentally ill, or there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment. Upon
arresting judgment the court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the offense charged is entered or jeopardy has attached, order a commitment until
the defendant is charged anew or retried, or may enter any other order as may
be just and proper under the circumstances.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Challenge to jurisdiction.
Grounds.
Mental illness.
Prosecutorial misconduct.
Standard.
Variance between charge and verdict.
Cited.
Challenge to jurisdiction.
Jurisdictional question was properly raised
by motion in arrest of judgment. State v. Merritt, 67 Utah 325, 247 P. 497 (1926).
Grounds.
A judgment may be arrested based on an insufficiency of the evidence or facts as proved in
trial or as admitted by the parties. State v.
Workman, 806 P.2d 1198 (Utah Ct. App. 1991),
affd, 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993).
An arrest of judgment is appropriate where
the -verdict is based on inherently improbable
evidence. State v. Workman. 806 P.2d 1198
(Utah Ct. App. 1991), affd, 852 P.2d 981 (Utah
1993).
Mental illness.
Where an alienist specifically found defendant competent to proceed to sentencing, trial
court did not err in refusing to arrest judgment
despite the fact that defendant may have suffered from an undetermined mental illness.
State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 1988).
Prosecutorial misconduct
Prosecutorial misconduct before- trial was

grounds for a new trial, not an arrest of judgment, even though defendant's motion for arrest of judgment or in the alternative for a new
trial was made before imposition of sentence.
State v. Owens, 753 P.2d 976 (Utah Ct App.
1988).
Standard.
A trial court may arrest a jury verdict when
the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable as to an element of the
crime that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to that element,
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983);
State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982);
State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976);
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993).
Variance between charge and verdict
Although the verdict form signed by the jury
foreman stated that the defendant was guilty
of "forcible sexual assault" and the information
had charged the defendant with "aggravated
sexual assault," the variance did not justify the
granting of a motion to arrest judgment on the
basis of uncertainty as to what the jury intended; an error on the jury verdict form does
not create uncertainty per se, and there was no
reason to doubt that the jury intended to find
the defendant guilty as charged. State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987).
Cited in State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29
(Utah 1989); State v. Belgard, 830 P.2d 264
(Utah 1992).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am* Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Law §§ 520 to 524.
C.J.S. — 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law i 1453 et
seq.

AJLR. — Coram nobis on ground of other's
confession to crime, 46 A.L.R.4th 468.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law •» 974 to
976.

Rule 24. Motion for new trial.
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant
a new triaHn the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which
had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party.
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The
motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in
support of the motion. If additional time is required to procure affidavits or
evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it
deems reasonable.

Rule 24

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
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(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days after imposition of
sentence, or within such further time as the court may GJL during the ten-day
period.
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no
trial had been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned
either in evidence or in argument.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Absence of witness.
Affidavits of jurors.
Bias or prejudice of jurors.
Discretion of court
Evidence in support of motion.
Misconduct of jury.
Motion to reopen preliminary rehearing.
—Dismissal of charges.
Newly discovered evidence.
Prosecutorial misconduct
Verdict supported by evidence.
Cited.
Absence of witness.
Where the evidence was discovered before
trial but the witness was absent, not only must
diligence have been shown in attempting to obtain the testimony of such witness, but an application must have been made to obtain" a
postponement of the trial so as to give opportunity to obtain such witness or evidence before
defendant might avail himself of a motion for a
new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence. State v. Weaver, 78 Utah 555,6 P.2d
167 (1931).
Defendant was not entitled to a new trial to
produce a witness who was unavailable At trial
where witness' absence was not due to any
error or impropriety at trial, but was due to
attendance at an out-of-town convention, and
defendant did not ask for a new trial date or a
continuance to accommodate the witness' calendar. State v. Gehring, 694 F.2d 599 (Utah
1984).
Affidavits of jurors.
Verdict of guilty of larceny of sheep which
recommended leniency was not a chance verdict, and could not be impeached by affidavits
of eight jurors that they would not have voted
defendant guilty if they thought he would
thereby receive a jail sentence. State v. Priestley, 97 Utah 158, 91 P.2d 447 (1939).
Motion for new trial following rape conviction on ground of misconduct of jury was properly denied, notwithstanding affidavits of four
jurors filed in support of motion reciting that
they were in favor of acquittal on first ballot
but that, as (me of jurors stated that if they
found defendant guilty with recommendation
of leniency he would have to serve only a few
months in jail, they thereupon were persuaded
to vote for conviction,-where affidavits showed
no coercion or tacti& which might have
stripped any juror of his ability to act in accordance with his honest convictions. State v.
Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P.2d 973 (1947).
Jurors could not impeach their verdicts except in instance! expressly made exceptions by
legislative enactments and, where a defendant
submitted affidavits of two jurors to the affect

that, if the record did not support the conclusion of the state's expert witness then these
two jurors would not have voted for the verdict
such affidavits were conditional and would be
of no avail to the defendant where the verdict
was justified by the record. State v.
Rivenburgh, 11 Utah 2d 95, 355 P.2d 689
(1960), appeal dismissed, 368 U.S. 144, 82 S.
Ct 247, 7 L. E i 2d 188, cert denied, 368 U.S.
922, 82 S. Ct 246, 7 L Ed. 2d 137 (1961).
A juror's allegation that she misunderstood
the rule of law pertinent to unanimity would
not compel the court to grant a new trial where
the jury had been properly instructed on that
point State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89 (Utah 1981).
Bias or prejudice of jurors.
Where in a first degree murder prosecution,
a juror falsely stated, on his voir dire, that he
had neither expressed nor formed an opinion
concerning the case, and fact that he had prejudged defendant was not known to the defendant or his attorneys until after trial, the defendant would be grafted a new trial. State v.
Morgan, 23 Utah 212, 64 P. 356 (1901).
Where in a first degree murder prosecution,
the admitted facts showed both actual and implied bias of two of the jurors, there was sufficient ground for granting the defendant a new
trial. State v. Morgan, 23 Utah 212, 64 P. 356
(1901).
It was ground for granting a defendant a
new trial where juror, who, on his voir dire,
stared that he knew of no reason why he should
not sit in case, was a stockholder, director, and
debtor of corporation whose store the defendant was convicted of having burglarised,
where neither the defendant nor his attorney
knew of such juror's lack of impartiality until
after the trial. State v. Thompson, 24 Utah
314, 67 P. 789 (1902).
Previously expressed bias of a juror, falsely
denied on his voir dire, and unknown to the
defendant or his attorney until after the trial,
warranted granting of a new trial State v.
Mickle, 25 Utah 179, 70 P. 85641902).
Statement of jury foreman after verdict in
rape case, that "it is a wonder these boys are
still alive," did not require new trial on ground
that it showed prejudice or that juror had secured information outside court, where state* *
ment might have been conclusion based on evidence submitted to jury at trial. State v. Brinkman, 68 Utah 557, 251 P. 364 (1926).
In murder prosecution, court did not abuse
its discretion in refusing to grant motion for
new trial on ground that juror wss disqualified
as having determined guilt of defendant before
trial. State v. Draper, 63 Utah 115,27 P-2d 39
(1933).
In a riot prosecution where the defendant
subsequent to trial found that a juror was dtp-
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(2) Any person who violates this section is guilty of:
(a) a class A misdemeanor upon the first offense; and
(b) a third degree felony for each subsequent offense.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-509.6, enacted by
L. 1993 (2nd S.S.), ch-10, ft 4.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 10, § 7
makes the act effective on October 21,1993.

76-10-509.7. Parent or guardian knowing of minor's possession of dangerous weapon.
Any parent or guardian of a minor who knows that the minor is in possession
of a dangerous weapon in violation of Section 76-10-509 or a firearm in
violation of Section 76-10-509.4 and fails to make reasonable efforts to remove
the firearm from the minor's possession is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-10^509.7, enacted by
L. 1993 (2nd S.S.), ch. 10, 5 5.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 10, § 7
makes the act effective on October 21,1993.

76-10-509.9. Sales of firearms to juveniles.
(1) A person may not sell anyfirearmto a minor under 18 years of age unless
the minor is accompanied by a parent or guardian.
(2) Any person who violates this section is guilty of a third degree felony.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-509.9, enacted by
L. 1993 (2nd S.S.), ch* 13, J 1.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993 (2nd S.S.),

ch. 13, § 2 makes the act effective on October
21,1993.

76-10-510. Possession of weapon authorized — Permit or
license not required.
Nothing in this part shall be construed to prohibit a citizen of the-United
States or a lawftilly admitted alien over the age of eighteen years who resides
or is temporarily within this state and who is not within the excepted classes
as prescribed by Section 76-10-503fromowning, possessing, or ~;:epihg within
his place of residence or place of business or any vehicle under ms control any
pistol, revolver, or other firearm or dangerous weapon capable of being
concealed upon the person, and no permit or license to purchase, own, possess,
or to keep any such firearm or weapon at his place of residence, or place of
business, or any vehicle under his control, shall-be required of him.
History: C. 1953,76-10-510, enacted byX.
1973, ch. 196, t 76-10-510; 1991, ch. 17, 9 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-

ment, effective April 29, 1991, inserted "or a
lawfully admitted alien* near the beginning.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons and business, 57 A.LR.3d 938.
Firearms § 31.
Validity of state gun control legislation under
C.J.S. — 94 C.J.S. Weapons § 11.
gtate constitutional provisions securing the
A U L — Scope and effect of exception, in right to bear arms, 86 A.L.R.4th 931.
statute forbidding carrying of weapons, as to
K e y Numbers. — Weapons *=> 12.
person on his own premises or at his place of
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CRIMINAL CODE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d, — 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny
§ 101.

C.J.S. — 52A C.J.S. Larceny< § 18.
Key Numbers. — Larceny s» 10.

76-6-408. Receiving stolen property — Duties of pawnbrokers.
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property
of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or
withholding the property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen,
intending to deprive the owner of it.
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is presumed in the
case of an actor who:
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on a
separate occasion;
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding the
receiving offense charged;
(c) being a dealer in property of the sort received, retained, or disposed,
acquires it for a consideration which he knows is far below its reasonable
value; or
(d) if the value given for the property exceeds $20, is a pawnbroker or
person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or
secondhand merchandise or personal property, or an agent, employee, or
representative of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or obtains
property and fails to require the seller or person delivering the property to:
(i) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the
-property;
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the
bottom of the certificate next to his signature; and
(iii) provide at least one other positive form of picture identification.
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in
or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, and every
agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or person who fails to
comply with the requirements of Subsection (2)(d) shall be presumed to have
bought, received, or obtained the property knowing it to have been stolen or
unlawfiilly obtained. This presumption may be rebutted by proof.
(4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appears from the evidence
that the defendant was a pawnbroker or a person who has or operates a
business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal
property, or was an agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or
person, that the defendant bought, received, concealed, or withheld the
property without obtaining the information required in Subsection (2Xd), then
the burden shall be upon the defendant to show that the property bought,
received, or obtained was not stolen.
(5) Subsections (2)(d), (3), and (4) do not apply to scrap metal processors as
defined in Section 76-10-901.
(6) As used in-this section:
(a) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or title or lending on
the security of the property;
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(b) "Dealer" means a person in the business of buying or selling goods.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-408, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-408; 1979, ch. 71, § 1;
1993, ch. 102, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993, substituted aSub-_
section" for "paragraph* in Subsection
(2), subdivided Subsection (2)(d), moved uif the value
given for the property exceeds $20* which was
formerly in Subsection (2Xd)(i) to the introduc-

tory language, inserted "picture* in Subsection
(2)(d)(iii), redesignated former Subsections
(2)(d)(i) and (ii) as Subsections (3) and (4),
inserted Subsection (5), making a corresponding designation change, and made stylistic
changes.
Cross-References. — Pawnbrokers and secondhand dealers, § 11-6-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
stolen; (2) the defendant aided in concealing
this property; (3) at the time he so aided in
concealing it he knew the item had been stolen;
and (4) his purpose in acting was to deprive the
owner thereof of possession. State v. Lamm, 606
P.2d 229 (Utah 1980).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Applicability.
-Elements.
—Concealing stolen property.
—Receiving stolen property.
Entrapment.
Evidence.
Intent
Prima facie case.
Separate offenses.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
The presumption created in Subsection (2) is
constitutional when read in light-of § 76-1-503,
which provides that a presumption means only
that the issue of the -presumed fact must be
submitted to the jury unless its existence is
clearly negated and that the jury may treat
proof of the underlying facts as evidence of the
presumed fact, but does not disturb the requirement that the presumed fact, like all other
elements of the crime, must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Mullins, 549 P.2d 454
(Utah 1976).
- The phrase "believing that "it probably has
been stolen* in" Subsection (1), while not a
model of draftsmanship, is not unconstitutionally vague. State v. Plum, 552 P.2d 124 (Utah
1976).
Applicability.
The plain meaning of Subsection (2Xd) limits
its application to pawnbrokers and similar
businesses that generally deal in small purchases of secondhand consumer goods. It does
not include businesses that regularly deal in
large bulk orders of raw industrial material.
Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282 (Utah
1993).
Elements.
Concealing stolen-property.
The elements in the-crime of concealing or
aiding in the concealment of stolen property
are: (1) property belonging to another has been

—Receiving stolen property.
Elements of the crime of receiving stolen
property are: property belonging to another has
been stolen; the defendant received, retained or
disposed of the stolen property; at the time of
receiving, retaining or disposing of the property
the defendant knew or believed the property
was stolen; and the defendant acted purposely
to deprive the owneFof the possession of the
property. State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399 (Utah
1980).
Time of the alleged offense is not an essential
element of the crime of receiving stolen property; state's proof that offense occurred on a
date different than that alleged in the information was not fatal to defendant's conviction for
receiving stolen property where the applicable
limitations statute had not run at the time the
charge was filed. State v. Wilson, 642 P.2d 394
(Utah 1982).
In order to obtain a conviction for theft by
receiving, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:
(1) The defendant received, retained, or disposed of the property of another, (2) knowing
that the property had been stolen or believing
that it probably had been stolen, (3) with the
purpose to deprive the owner thereof. State v.
Hill, 727 P.2d 221 (Utah 1986).
Entrapment.
Trial court properly found entrapment in a
"sting" operation involving use-of an attractive
female undercover police officer to sell stolen
merchandise to a jewelry store owner who may
have been encouraged to suggest that his relationship with the officer become more intimate.
State v. Kaufman, 734 P.2d 465 (Utah 1987).
Evidence.
Evidence establishing receiving stolen prop-
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RLED DISTRICT COURT

KIMBERLY A. CLARK, #5454
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDERS ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300

Third Judicial District

JUL 2 8 1995

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

8y

Telephone: 532-5444

OEPUN cifiw

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

AFFIDAVIT OF CASEY SANSLOW
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL

Plaintiff,
vs.

KIP LANE MASSEY,

Case No.

Defendant.

951900059FS

JUDGE KENNETH RIGTRUP

STATE OF UTAH
: SS.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

CASEY SANSLOW, being first duly swom upon oath, deposes and says:
1. I was charged in this case along with Kip Lane Massey.
2. I hired Randy Ludlow to represent me.
3. The weekend before this offense occurred, I was In Price, Utah, visiting my father,
Terry Sanslow.
4. While I was staying at my father's house, I took the 2.25 caliber Derringer pistol
from his collection, and brought It to Salt Lake with me.
5. The following week, my mother told me that my father's home had been broken
into and all his guns had been stolen. I was worried that I would be blamed for

flfiflffl*

breaking into my father's house if I were found with the Derringer, so I decided to get
rid of it.
6. 1 went over to Kip Massey's house to meet with him and he wasn't home. I met
someone on the porch by the name of Travis Kirby and asked him If he wanted to
purchase the gun. I sold the gun to Mr. Kirby at that time for $30.00.
7. Kip was not at home when I sold the gun to Travis Kirby. Kip did not see the
gun, because I did not show it to him.
8. Kip told me that a detective with the Murray Police was looking for me. I called
him the same day and went into the police station. While I was there, I signed a
statement telling the police that I sold the gun to the Kirby's and that Kip had nothing
to do with It.
9. I entered into a plea bargain with the District Attorney's Office to plead guilty to
a third degree felony on this case, before Judge Tyrone E. Medley on April 17,
1995.
10. I was subpoenaed to testify at Kip Massey's trial which was to begin on April 13,
1995. I was advised by my attorney, Randy Ludlow, to invoke my fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination If I were called to testify.
11. I have since entered a plea on this case, have been sentenced and am now
available to testify.
DATED this £](

day of ]uly, 1995.

C

A

S

^
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Subscribed to and sworn to before me thispn

My Commission Expires

day of ]uly, 1995.

=1M/

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake District Attorney's
Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, UT

84111 this

day of July, 1995.
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